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An Analytical Approach for Making
Management Decisions Concerning
Corporate Restructuring
Beixin Lina,*, Zu-Hsu Leeb and Richard Petersonb
a

Department of Accounting, Law, and Taxation, Montclair State University, 1 Normal Ave., Montclair,
NJ 07043, USA
b
Department of Management and Information Systems, Montclair State University, NJ, USA

Internal corporate restructuring activities, such as downsizing, sale or termination of a
business line, facility closure, consolidation, or relocation, often occur as part of managerial
strategies intended to improve eﬃciency, control costs, and adapt to an ever-changing business
environment. Such actions frequently result in fundamental changes in a business’s
organization, its strategies, its systems, and its operations. They can unsettle a business and
often signiﬁcantly aﬀect current and future earnings and cash ﬂows. In this paper we propose a
novel decision-making model through the use of the dynamic programming technique to
illustrate how management can determine the optimal timing and appropriate restructuring
actions that maximize the beneﬁts of a restructuring program. Copyright # 2006 John Wiley
& Sons, Ltd.

INTRODUCTION
Restructuring has become increasingly common
during the past decade. In order to adjust to the
ever-changing business environment, restructuring
is one option that may improve company performance. Restructuring plans take many forms,
such as exiting a line of business, closing,
consolidating or relocating a facility; though can
be a broad company-wide reorganization that
impinges upon the nature and focus of operations.
Restructuring plans present a great challenge to
companies. Diﬃcult decisions must be made
concerning appropriate workforce size and skill
requirements, plant capacity and location, and
*Correspondence to: Department of Accounting, Law and
Taxation, Moutclair State University, 1 Normal Ave.,
Montclair, NJ 07043, USA. E-mail: linb@mail.montclair.edu
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possible production focus shifts. These decisions
aﬀect business strategies, operations, organizational functions and existing management structures.
On the accounting side, restructuring activities
may be costly, and signiﬁcantly aﬀect company
earnings, cash ﬂows and future economic performance. Short-term earnings are likely to fall. Since
the estimation of restructuring charge and the
timing of its recognition are somewhat subjective,
it is possible for managers to manipulate a
restructuring charge schedule to show a better
overall earnings picture (e.g. Francis et al., 1996;
Moehrle, 2002). Therefore, the timing, measurement and disclosure practices of such charges are
emerging as important and sometimes controversial areas in accounting practice. This has drawn
the attention of regulatory bodies, investment
communities and academic researchers.
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Prior studies on this topic have focused on
examining the characteristics of ﬁrms that undertake restructuring activities (e.g. John et al., 1992;
Berger and Ofek, 1995), the causes of restructuring
initiatives (e.g. Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993;
Gibbs, 1993; Berger and Ofek, 1999), and the
wealth and performance eﬀects of restructuring
events (e.g. Brickley and Van Drunen, 1990;
Chaney et al., 2000; Kross et al., 2000; Poon
et al. 2001). Few studies have built on these
insights to the point of developing and discussing
robust restructuring strategies. For example, when
is the right time to reorganize the company? What
is the goal of the restructuring? What speciﬁc
activities should be in the restructuring plan? How
much time will it take to implement the restructuring program? Will it be a one-time event, or a
multi-stage program? In this study, we will explore
these strategy-related questions analytically, from
the perspective of managers and decision makers.
We present a decision-making model and apply
dynamic programming skills to conceptually illustrate how to implement an eﬀective restructuring
plan that maximizes the probability of achieving
management goals.
To address the topic systematically, the subsequent sections are organized to logically develop
this model and discuss its use. The next two
sections examine the key business forces, which
underlie restructuring decisions, as found in the
existing literature. In these two sections, we
identify the relevant variables that may apply to
the decision-making process during the planning
and implementation stages of a restructuring plan,
including state variables that provide fundamental
information for managerial decision-making, as
well as decision variables that characterize alternatives. We follow up with a section that presents
primary objectives of restructuring and measures
of restructuring eﬀects. Penultimate section formulates a quantitative decision-making model of
the overall process, including necessary variables
and parameters. Finally, the future research
directions are outlined in the last section.

THE CHARACTERIZATION OF STATE
VARIABLES
Among factors that may inﬂuence a restructuring
decision, agency conﬂicts play an important role.
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The agency theory states that mangers have
incentives to expand ﬁrms beyond the optimal
size to maximize their own utility, even when
growth and diversiﬁcation are not in the best
interest of shareholders (e.g. Jensen, 1986; Jensen
and Murphy, 1990; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger
and Ofek, 1995). Denis et al. (1997) and Berger
and Ofek (1999) ﬁnd that corporate control events,
such as management turnover, outside shareholder
pressure, changes in a management compensation
plan, or ﬁnancial distress, frequently precede
corporate refocusing programs. This suggests that
frequently, restructurings are taking place to
reduce those agency conﬂicts. Empirical ﬁndings
show that restructurings are often initiated to
correct past ineﬃcient expansion and diversiﬁcation executed under either internal or external
pressures. Several studies (e.g. Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993; Gibbs, 1993; Kang and Shivdasani,
1997) present evidence that corporate restructurings are likely to be triggered by the presence of
free cash ﬂow, limited investment opportunities,
weak governance structure, and takeover threats1.
Therefore, these factors are indicators of agency
conﬂicts and should be included as relevant state
variables.
Another important factor that inﬂuences the
decision to restructure is the company’s operating
performance. Although restructuring can be involuntarily driven by external forces, to reduce
agency conﬂicts, often it is undertaken voluntarily,
to deal with poor performance. Restructurings
became a more common response to poor operating performance when the frequency of corporate
takeover activities fell considerably during the
early 1990s (Kang and Shivdasani, 1997; Denis
and Kruse, 2000). Therefore, operating performance prior to a restructuring is also an important
state variable that will inﬂuence managers’ decisions.
A change in business environment is another
factor that can aﬀect management’s restructuring
strategies. Restructuring may occur as a response
to major changes in the business climate and/or
surroundings, such as technological or product
innovations, changes in tax laws, deregulations,
and/or foreign competition. Those changes may be
only speciﬁc to one industry, but can be economywide. Another environmental factor is the
‘bandwagon’ eﬀect, which refers to managers’
tendency to mimic the actions of other managers
(e.g. Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993). In addition,
Manage. Decis. Econ. 27: 655–666 (2006)
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excess capacity within an industry can force ﬁrms
to exit particular activities (e.g. Jensen, 1993).
Excess capacity may be caused by oversupply,
demand reduction, or technological changes.
Therefore, prominent changes in the business
environment should be included as a state variable
in our analysis as well.

THE CHARACTERIZATION OF
RESTRUCTURING DECISION-MARKING
PROCESS
When management is considering restructuring as
an option to enhance a ﬁrm’s eﬃciency, proﬁtability, and competitiveness, certain questions are
typically asked. When will be the right time to
embark on a restructuring? Will it be a one-time
shot, or be followed by subsequent restructuring(s)? What speciﬁc corporate problems or
challenges will be addressed by restructuring
activities?
Timing
As discussed earlier, the decision to restructure can
be driven by many factors, and is often a tough
one to make. Ideally, managers should anticipate a
crisis and act preemptively, before being overtaken
by the event. Prior studies show that greater value
can be created when a restructuring is done
preemptively rather than under the threat of
ﬁnancial distress or hostile takeover (e.g. Donaldson, 1994; Gilson, 2001). However, it is often quite
diﬃcult to persuade corporate stakeholders to
restructure at an early stage, in the absence of a
serious crisis. The negative eﬀect of a restructuring
charge on the ﬁrm’s operating income also aﬀects
the timing decision. Moreover, managers may be
reluctant to admit past mistakes, and choose not
to restructure (e.g. Boot, 1992). Another factor is
that labor laws and union rules make it costly for
ﬁrms to lay oﬀ employees. Finally, organizational
restructuring might be hard to implement if
employees resist the change. These barriers show
the need to develop a rational decision model that
determines the optimal timing for implementing a
restructuring plan.
Restructuring Frequency and Activities
Additional restructuring activities may take place
as part of a multi-phase restructuring plan, as
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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ﬁrms continue to address pressing ﬁnancial and
operational problems, or as new crises/opportunities emerge. Atiase et al. (2004) ﬁnd that ﬁrms
with multiple restructurings are more likely to
improve their earnings and cash ﬂows in the
post-restructuring period, which suggests there
is a link between restructuring frequency and a
change in future operating performance. However,
repetitive restructuring charges may have negative
implications, especially across a short horizon.
The ﬁndings of Adut et al. (2003) show that
compensation committees consider recurring
restructuring activities within a short time frame
as less deserving, and so do not completely
shield CEO cash compensation from the adverse
eﬀect of subsequent restructuring charges on
earnings. These empirical ﬁndings therefore show
that the determination of optimal restructuring
frequency is essential to managerial decisionmaking.
Restructuring activities typically include, but
are not limited to, the following: workforce
reduction, downsizing, asset sales, closures or
consolidation of facilities, business relocation,
eliminating unproﬁtable operations, changes
in management structure, or fundamental reorganizations that aﬀect the nature and focus
of operations. Diﬀerent restructuring activities
can have a sequence of interacting intermediate and long-term eﬀects, which in turn
may yield a mixed outcome. For example, a
system upgrade, use of advanced technology,
or the streamlining of operations can cause
reduction of personnel and improve worker
productivity, but lower employee morale.
Financially, workforce reduction entails shortterm cash outlay for severance and other costs
of employee termination beneﬁts, but helps to
limit personnel expenditure in future years. In
addition, previous studies present evidence
that asset divestitures or refocusing programs
are value-increasing because they eliminate
negative impact of the divested asset on the
remaining assets (e.g. Comment and Jarrell,
1995; John and Ofek, 1995). However, plant
closings are generally viewed negatively by the
markets (Blackwell et al., 1990), especially for
ﬁnancially weak ﬁrms (Gombola and Tsetsekos,
1992). The ultimate eﬀect of a set of restructuring
activities depends on whether the beneﬁts
brought by the synergized activities outweigh the
costs incurred.
Manage. Decis. Econ. 27: 655–666 (2006)
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THE OBJECTIVES OF CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURINGS AND THEIR EFFECTS
Corporate restructurings can aspire to a variety of
goals, such as making the ﬁrm more cost
competitive, abandoning a ﬂawed corporate strategy, exiting negative cash ﬂow segments, and/or
increasing the ﬁrm’s market value. The impact of a
restructuring can be measured by changes in a
ﬁrm’s stock market performance during the postrestructuring period. The restructuring is often an
ongoing dynamic process. Investors will continually revise their expectations about the eﬀect of
restructuring on a ﬁrm’s value and future proﬁtability as they receive new information. The ﬁrm’s
long-term stock performance, after the market and
industry adjustment, will show if shareholders’
wealth has been enhanced by the restructuring
eﬀorts.
Changes in operating performance during the
period following a restructuring provide another
perspective to assess the long-term impact of a
restructuring plan. Several studies examine this
issue and ﬁnd that restructurings do not lead to
signiﬁcant improvements in future operating
performance in three to ﬁve years immediately
following the restructurings (e.g. Brickley and Van
Drunen, 1990; Lopez et al., 2001). The insignificant results can be caused by mixing ‘good’
restructurings with ‘bad’ ones, thus averaging out
the eﬀects of restructurings. Atiase et al. (2004)
revisit this issue and show that post-restructuring
performance changes are positive for ﬁrms with
losses. They argue that it is because ‘ﬁrms with
losses in the restructuring year may face a more
diﬃcult operating environment than ﬁrms with
gains, and may therefore be more likely than ﬁrms
with gains to use restructuring to address operating weakness. (pp. 508–509)’ Denis and Kruse
(2000) and Kang and Shivdasani (1997) present
similar ﬁndings, that ﬁrms which restructured after
they had a substantial performance decline improved their operating performance substantially
in the three years following the restructuring.

MODEL DEVELOPMENT
When restructuring is considered, the ﬁrst question
might be, ‘Is it workable?’ As discussed in the
previous section, the answer may depend on many
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

factors, and is not always a clear-cut ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
Accordingly, a more complex, yet more pragmatic,
question arises, ‘When and how should restructuring take place?’ Clearly, this answer will depend
strongly upon the speciﬁcs of each case and the
information utilized by decision-makers. An analytical model is presented here which describes the
process of decision-making in regard to restructuring activities. In the model, it is assumed that a
company can control the form and timing of
restructuring. In addition, restructuring charges
are assumed to properly reﬂect the actual restructuring costs (so here, we do not consider the use of
accounting to manipulate restructuring charges in
order to meet a certain earnings goal).
Elements and notation of the model
One of management’s major responsibilities is
planning, which is to establish enterprise-wide
objectives and propose ways of accomplishing
them within a speciﬁed time frame. Within the
context of restructuring, managers seek a strategy
to determine the best timing, and detail the steps,
so that the plan may be accomplished within the
given window. For the purpose of our analytical
model, the maximal likelihood of achieving a
successful post-restructuring performance (relative
to corporate targets) within this time window is
clearly an objective that is consistent with most
managers’ primary business goals.
As mentioned in the second section, state
variables represent factors or information used
by managers in their decision-making process. For
each period, these variables also provide information on how likely it is that the goal can be
achieved in the future. Values of the state variables
may probabilistically change over time. This
uncertainty can be described using transition
probabilities between the states in diﬀerent periods. Therefore, within each period, managers will
review current operating and ﬁnancial states, and
estimate how business conditions will evolve, to
determine the best business plan on a rolling basis.
Take Eastman Kodak as an example. This
company has been adversely impacted by not
adapting itself fast enough into the digital imaging
market, which took over the traditional ﬁlm
imaging business at an unexpectedly explosive
rate. Kodak has undergone a series of restructuring programs since 1992 to reposition itself in the
photographic equipment and supplies industry
Manage. Decis. Econ. 27: 655–666 (2006)
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and to realign its worldwide operations towards its
‘digitally oriented growth strategy’. Below is an
excerpt from the management discussion in this
company’s 2004 annual report, which discusses its
2004–2006 restructuring program.
‘Currently, the Company is being adversely
impacted by the progressing digital substitution. As the Company continues to adjust its
operating model in light of changing business
conditions, it is probable that ongoing cost
reduction activities will be required from time
to time. In accordance with this, the Company
periodically announces planned restructuring
programs, which often consist of a number of
restructuring initiatives.’ (Eastman Kodak 2004
10-K)
This indicates that ongoing decision-making to
ensure a safe transition through changing business
conditions plays a crucial role in restructuring
planning. The transition probability may be one
essential element to model the changes in business
conditions. In practice, these probabilities can be
estimated by the analysis of historical data,
expected changes in business conditions, managers’ experience, or other appropriate means. They
will be assumed within our decision model,
because the actual estimation is on a case-by-case
basis and requires inside information.To start, we
divide the time window into N periods. In each
period, management decides whether or not
restructuring should be taken. The following
notation is used to associate the restructuring
decision process described above with analytical
modeling:
xk = the set of state variables for period k
(k ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; N),
aj = the numerical variable representing the
restructuring activities in period j (‘’ is used when
aj cannot be speciﬁed, that is, no restructuring
takes place in period j ),
% k Þ= the probability that, given xk for period
Pðx
k, the company reaches its target by the end of
period k.
In addition, since a restructuring event generally
will have an eﬀect on both the current period as
well as several subsequent periods, we assume that
the expected number of these periods is t. That is,
previous restructuring decisions made within last
t1 periods, aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; ak1 will aﬀect the
determination of ak for the current period k, and
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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these decisions (aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; ak ) will impact
the state transition from xk to xk+1. Thus, we
deﬁne
Pk;kþ1 ðxkþ1 jxk ; aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; ak Þ ¼ the probability that xk transits to xk+1, given the
previous restructuring activities that occurred in
previous t1 periods and the activity in the
current period.
This addresses the transition probability between the current state for period k and next state
for period k+1, which depends on the activities
aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; ak conducted in the previous
periods. This also implies that aktþ1 in period
kt+1 has inﬂuence on the following t state
transitions: xktþ1 ! xktþ2 ; xktþ2 ! xktþ3 ; . . . ;
and xk ! xk+1.
A Decision Model
Recall that, given the future N periods, managers
develop (or revise if needed) a restructuring plan
from period to period (or over time). Consider one
particular period. The plan should be able to show
the optimal decision for this period, given all
relevant factors. In addition, this plan should
address possible conditions for the future periods
and show the decisions in response to them. The
probabilities associated with the changes between
current and future conditions might need to be reestimated within each period to continuously
provide managers with updated information for
decision-making, and to further align operations
with management goals. The purpose is to maximize the probability of successfully reaching
the company’s target(s) by the end of N periods.
Here we use an indicator variable, Ik ; which
equals 1 if the target has been achieved (i.e. a
success) in periods 1, 2,. . ., k1, and zero
otherwise. When determining ak in period k, the
current state (xk), whether or not success has been
achieved (Ik), and the prior restructuring activities
(aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; ak1 ) that may have inﬂuence
on the present period, are the relevant information
for decision-making. We deﬁne Vk ðxk ; Ik ; aktþ1 ;
aktþ2 ; . . . ; ak1 Þ = the maximal probability that,
given the information of xk ; Ik ; aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . .
and ak1 in period k, the company will have
success some time by the end of N periods.
Clearly, in period k, if the management determines that the target has been reached (Ik ¼ 1), the
probability that we have success by the end of N
periods is one, because it has already occurred.
Manage. Decis. Econ. 27: 655–666 (2006)
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That is,
Vk ðxk ; 1; aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; ak1 Þ ¼ 1
for any xk ; akt ; aktþ1 ; . . . ; and ak1 :
In this case, it is clear that restructuring would not
need to be considered (ak ¼ ). If the target has
not been reached (Ik ¼ 0), we have two options: no
restructuring, or determining restructuring activities ak. However, for each decision, we need to
consider all possible state transitions and the
likelihood of achieving the objective for each
transition. Then, the probabilities of obtaining a
success for each decision are calculated, and the
best decision will create the greatest chance for the
company to reach its corporate target. The above
concept can be addressed mathematically according to the principle of optimality as follows. If we
choose no restructuring in the current period, Vk 
ðxk ; 0; aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; ak1 Þ will be
X
Pk;kþ1 ðxkþ1 jxk ; aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; Þ
xkþ1

% kþ1 ÞÞ
 ð1  Pðx
 Vkþ1 ðxkþ1 ; 0; aktþ2 ; aktþ3 ; . . . ; Þ
X
Pk;kþ1 ðxkþ1 jxk ; aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; Þ
þ
xkþ1

9
8 P
Pk;kþ1 ðxkþ1 jxk ; aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; ak Þ
>
>
>
>
>
>
xkþ1
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ð1  Pðx
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>
>
=
<
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>
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>
>
>
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þ
>
>
>
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>
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>
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The decision for period k is the option (if success
Pk;kþ1 ðxkþ1 jxk ; aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; Þ
¼
has not been achieved) that provide Vk 
xkþ1
ðxk ; 0; aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; ak1 Þ .
% kþ1 ÞÞ
 ð1  Pðx
The above recursive formulation ﬁnds the
optimal solution for period k through backward
 Vkþ1 ðxkþ1 ; 0; aktþ2 ; aktþ3 ; . . . ; Þ
X
calculations from the end of period N. The
Pk;kþ1 ðxkþ1 jxk ; aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; Þ
þ
boundary condition for the above recursive
xkþ1
formulation is
% kþ1 Þ
 Pðx
VNþ1 ðxNþ1 ; 1; aNtþ2 ; aNtþ3 ; . . . ; aN Þ ¼ 1;
or if restructuring is adopted, we need to decide VNþ1 ðxNþ1 ; 0; aNtþ2 ; aNtþ3 ; . . . ; aN Þ ¼ 0:
the appropriate restructuring activities ak. Thus,
The above second equation states that, in the end
Vk ðxk ; 0; aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; ak1 Þ will be
of N periods, if the performance target has not
9 been reached (INþ1 ¼ 0), it is impossible for
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P
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>
>
>
>
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>
>
; sent time can be solved by the above recursive
:
Vkþ1 ðxkþ1 ; 1; aktþ2 ; aktþ3 ; . . . ; ak Þ
equation. Note that, at the beginning of period
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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one, a2t, a1t,. . . and a0 should be known, and
% k Þ and Pk;kþ1 ðxkþ1 jxk ; aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; ak Þ for
Pðx
k ¼ 1; . . . ; N and each xk and xk+1 need to be
estimated. Furthermore, the appropriate decisions
in the future and the corresponding maximal
probabilities of reaching the target by the end of
N periods (i.e. Vk ðxk ; 0; aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; ak1 Þ for
k ¼ 2; . . . ; N ) may be obtained as well by the
recursive equation. Since we cannot know what
the future states will be, the model calculates these
maximal probabilities for each one of all possible
future state conditions. Coupled with the possible
transitions from the current state, these probabilities are used to determine the current optimal
restructuring decision so that the probability
of achieving the objective is maximized at the
present time.
The proposed method provides managers with a
rational tool for making the best restructuring
decision. Within each period, we may re-deﬁne the
length of the future horizon that is being planned,
letting current period be period one, and then reestimate all the relevant probabilities (e.g. Pk;kþ1 
% k Þ for all k)
ðxkþ1 jxk ; aktþ1 ; aktþ2 ; . . . ; ak Þ and Pðx
to take into account the factor of evolution over
time. Then, using the information of the current
state variables and previous restructuring events,
we can apply this method, along with the
boundary condition, to ﬁnd the best restructuring
decision for the current period, if the corporate
objective has yet to be achieved.
An Numerical Example
A simple example is presented here which illustrates the use of the analytical technique outlined
above for restructuring decision-making. Suppose
that, in year 1, a company considers conducting
restructuring activities in the next three years so as
to achieve the goal of 20% growth in return on
equity (ROE) (i.e. success) by the end of the fourth
year (N þ 1 ¼ 4). The management seeks to
determine when and how restructuring(s) should
be taken within next three years, if needed.
Assume that this is the ﬁrst time in its history the
ﬁrm has considered restructuring (or, any prior
restructuring activities are too remote to have any
tangible eﬀects on the operating performance in
the starting period). Management considers the
proﬁtability of its business (in a proﬁt or loss
position, coded as 1 or 0) as the state of the
company (in a more generalized case, the state can
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

be deﬁned as a set of variables or factors such as
those discussed in the second section). In addition,
downsizing (e.g. personnel reduction and facility
closures) and change in management structure are
considered to be two alternative restructuring
activities (denoted by ak ¼ 1 and 0, respectively,
for k ¼ 1; 2; 3). It is estimated that 70% of ‘proﬁt’
ﬁrms may achieve 20% growth of ROE in one year
%
( Pð1Þ
¼ 0:70 for k ¼ 1; 2; 3), whereas only 5% of
%
‘loss’ ﬁrms can get to this goal ( Pð0Þ
¼ 0:05 for
k ¼ 1; 2; 3). Furthermore, assume that a particular
restructuring event has a signiﬁcant impact on the
ﬁrm’s operating performance only up to two years
after the restructuring (i.e. t ¼ 2), because its eﬀect
is likely to be attenuated by other events in a
longer term. We make this assumption to keep the
illustration straightforward, even though a particular restructuring event may have an impact
beyond two years (as prior studies have shown).
Here, t ¼ 2 implies that the transition probabilities
from the state xk to the future state xk+1 between
period k and k+1 will depend on the restructuring
activities in periods k and k-1 (ak and ak1).
Additionally, we assume this company is operating
in a stable business environment, where the
transition probabilities between two given states
of any two consecutive periods are assumed to be
constant for the future three periods. That is,
Pk;kþ1 ðxkþ1 jxk ; ak1 ; ak Þ for k ¼ 1; 2; 3 are the same,
if (xk+1, xk, ak1, ak) are the same for k ¼ 1; 2; 3:
The simpliﬁcations made above will not aﬀect the
technical validity of the proposed model. Assume
that the management estimates the following
Pk;kþ1 ðxkþ1 jxk ; ak1 ; ak Þ; as shown in tables (or
probability matrix) below, which applies for
k ¼ 1; 2; 3:
xk+1

xk+1

xk+1

xk

1

0

1

0

1

0

1
0

0.70
0.20

0.30
0.80

0.60
0.10

0.40
0.90

0.50
0.10

0.50
0.90

ðak1 ; ak Þ ¼ ð; Þ ðak1 ; ak Þ ¼ ð; 0Þ

xk+1

ðak1 ; ak Þ ¼ ð; 1Þ

xk+1

xk+1

xk

1

0

1

0

1

0

1
0

0.75
0.30

0.25
0.70

0.60
0.20

0.40
0.80

0.70
0.10

0.30
0.90

ðak1 ; ak Þ ¼ ð0; Þ ðak1 ; ak Þ ¼ ð0; 0Þ

ðak1 ; ak Þ ¼ ð0; 1Þ
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xk+1

xk+1

xk+1

xk

1

0

1

0

1

0

1
0

0.75
0.30

0.25
0.70

0.80
0.20

0.20
0.80

0.70
0.35

0.30
0.65

ðak1 ; ak Þ ¼ ð1; Þ ðak1 ; ak Þ ¼ ð1; 0Þ

ðak1 ; ak Þ ¼ ð1; 1Þ

The tables show that, for example, if the state of
the ﬁrm is currently ‘proﬁt’ and it has not done
restructuring in both last year and this year, the
probability that this ﬁrm will stay proﬁtable next
year is 0.70. If the state of the ﬁrm is currently
‘loss’ and it did not restructure last year but did
‘downsizing’ this year, the probability that the
state of this ﬁrm will change to ‘proﬁt’ next year
is 0.10.
Now, we may use the recursive formulation to
develop the restructuring strategy for the next
three years to maximize the probability of success.
For year k ¼ N þ 1 ¼ 4; we have
V4 ðx4 ; 1; a3 Þ ¼ 1;
V4 ðx4 ; 0; a3 Þ ¼ 0:
for x4 ¼ 0 and 1, and a3 = ; 0 and 1. This above
states that, the probability of success is one if the
target of ROE growth has been achieved within
four years (I4 ¼ 1). On the other hand, by our
deﬁnition the probability of management achieving its goal is zero if the ROE growth has not
been attained by the end of next three years
(I4 ¼ 0). In this case, no decision needs to be made
since year 4 is out of the planning window (years 1,
2 and 3).
For k ¼ 3; since V4 ðx4 ; 1; a3 Þ ¼ 1 and V4 ðx4 ; 0;
a3 Þ ¼ 0 hold for x4 ¼ 0 and 1, and a3 = ; 0, and
1, we need to choose a3 from ; 0 and 1 using the
following if the corporate target has not been
achieved (I3 ¼ 0):
V3 ðx3 ; 0; a2 Þ
(
X
% 4 Þ;
P3;4 ðx4 jx3 ; a2 ; Þ  Pðx
¼ max
X
x4

X

x4

% 4 Þ;
P3;4 ðx4 jx3 ; a2 ; 0Þ  Pðx
)

% 4Þ :
P3;4 ðx4 jx3 ; a2 ; 1Þ  Pðx

x4

For example, for a ‘proﬁt’ ﬁrm that failed to
achieve success in period 3 and did not do
restructuring last period, the following can be
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

obtained using the above equation,
9
8
a3 ¼  : P3;4 ð1j1; ; Þ >
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
%
%
>
>

Pð1Þ
þ
Pð0j1;
;
Þ

Pð0Þ
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
=
< a3 ¼ 0 : P3;4 ð1j1; ; 0Þ >
V3 ð1; 0; Þ ¼ max
>
>
%
%
Pð1Þ
þ Pð0j1; ; 0Þ  Pð0Þ
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
¼
1
:
P
ð1j1;
;
1Þ
a
>
>
3
3;4
>
>
>
>
;
:
%
%
Pð1Þ
þ Pð0j1; ; 1Þ  Pð0Þ
9
8
>
0:70  0:70 þ 0:30  0:05 >
>
>
=
<
¼ max 0:60  0:70 þ 0:40  0:05
>
>
>
;
: 0:50  0:70 þ 0:50  0:05 >
¼ 0:51 ðchoosinga3 ¼ Þ
That is, a restructuring action is not needed in
period 3 and the company can achieve the goal of
ROE growth in period 4 with the highest probability of 0.51. Similarly, we can have V3 ð1; 0; 0Þ ¼
0:54 with a3 ¼ ; V3 ð1; 0; 1Þ ¼ 0:57 with a3 ¼ 0; V3
ð0; 0; Þ ¼ 0:18 with a3 ¼ ; V3 ð0; 0; 0Þ ¼ 0:25 with
a3 ¼ ; and V3 ð0; 0; 1Þ ¼ 0:28 with a3 ¼ 1; which
describe what decisions should be made under
diﬀerent circumstances and the corresponding
maximal probabilities of reaching the target by
period 4. Also, we have V3 ðx3 ; 1; a2 Þ ¼ 1 for any x3
and a2. In this case, no restructuring is needed (a3
= ) since the ROE goal has been attained in or by
year 3 (i.e. I3 ¼ 1).
For k ¼ 2; for a ‘proﬁt’ ﬁrm that failed to
achieve the goal (I2 ¼ 0), if the company did not
do restructuring in the last period, the following
can be obtained:
V2 ð1; 0; Þ
9
8
%
P2;3 ð1j1; ; Þ  ð1  Pð1ÞÞ
 V3 ð1; 0; Þ
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
%
ð0j1;
;
Þ

ð1

Pð0ÞÞ

V
ð0;
0;
Þ
þP
>
>
2;3
3
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
%
>
>
ð1j1;
;
Þ

Pð1Þ
þP
>
>
2;3
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
%
>
>
ð0j1;
;
Þ

Pð0Þ
þP
2;3
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
%
>
>
ð1j1;
;
0Þ

ð1

Pð1ÞÞ

V
ð1;
0;
0Þ
P
2;3
3
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
%
 V3 ð0; 0; 0Þ =
þP2;3 ð0j1; ; 0Þ  ð1  Pð0ÞÞ
¼ max
>
>
%
>
>
>
> þP2;3 ð1j1; ; 0Þ  Pð1Þ
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
%
þP
ð0j1;
;
0Þ

Pð0Þ
>
>
2;3
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
%
>
>
ð1j1;
;
1Þ

ð1

Pð1ÞÞ

V
ð1;
0;
1Þ
P
2;3
3
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
%
>
>
ð0j1;
;
Þ

ð1

Pð0ÞÞ

V
ð0;
0;
1Þ
þP
2;3
3
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
%
>
>
ð1j1;
;
1Þ

Pð1Þ
þP
2;3
>
>
>
>
>
>
;
:
%
þP2;3 ð0j1; ; 1Þ  Pð0Þ
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9
8
>
0:70  0:30  0:51 þ 0:30  0:95 >
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
0:18
þ
0:70

0:70
þ
0:30

0:05
>
>
>
>
>
=
< 0:60  0:30  0:54 þ 0:4  0:95 >
¼ max
>
> 0:25 þ 0:60  0:70 þ 0:40  0:05 >
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
0:50

0:30

0:57
þ
0:50

0:95
>
>
>
>
>
;
: 0:28 þ 0:50  0:70 þ 0:50  0:05 >

since the ROE goal has been attained in or by year
2 (i.e. I2 ¼ 1).
Finally, we solve for V1 ð1; 0; Þ if the company is
‘proﬁt’ in year 1 and V1 ð0; 0; Þ if the company is
‘loss’ in year 1 (here a0 ¼  because it is assumed
that the company did not conduct restructuring
within past two years). Using the same skills, we
have

¼ 0:66 ðchoosing a2 ¼ Þ:

V1 ð1; 0; Þ ¼ 0:75 with a1 ¼ ;
V1 ð0; 0; Þ ¼ 0:57 with a1 ¼ 1:

That is, management does not need to conduct
restructuring and the company can achieve the
goal of ROE growth in the future periods with the
maximal probability 0.66. Similarly, we can have
V2 ð1; 0; 0Þ ¼ 0:70 with a2 ¼ 1; V2 ð1; 0; 1Þ ¼ 0:75
with a2 ¼ 0; V2 ð0; 0; Þ ¼ 0:37 with a2 ¼ 1;
V2 ð0; 0; 0Þ ¼ 0:41 with a2 ¼ ; and V2 ð0; 0; 1Þ ¼ 0:
51 with a2 ¼ 1: These describe what decisions
should be made under diﬀerent circumstances.
Also, we have V2 ðx2 ; 1; a1 Þ ¼ 1 for any x2 and a1.
In this case, no restructuring is needed (a2 ¼ )

Therefore, in year 1, if the state of the company is
‘proﬁt’, the best decision is ‘no restructuring’,
which provides the maximal probability of success
of 0.75. If the company is in ‘loss’ position, the
best decision is ‘downsizing’, which provides the
maximal probability of success of 0.57.
The above numerical results are summarized in
Figures 1 and 2, which show the best restructuring
plan at year 1, in order to reach the business target
within the 3-year window (i.e. succeed by year 4).

Year 1

State: loss; Decision:
downsizing; Max. Prob.
of success = 0.57

Reach the business target
by year 2: success

Unable to reach the business target by year 2
State: profit; Decision:
change management; Max
Prob. of success = 0.75

State: loss; Decision:
downsizing; Max Prob. of
success = 0.51

Reach the business target
by year 3: success

Year 2

Reach the business target
by year 3: success

Unable to reach the business target by year 3
State: profit; Decision: no
restructuring; Max Prob.
of success = 0.54

State: loss; Decision: no
restructuring; Max Prob.
of success = 0.25

State: profit; Decision:
change management; Max
Prob. of success = 0.57

State: loss; Decision:
downsizing; Max Prob. of
success = 0.28

Year 3

Outcome of the plan:
the target is reached by year 4
or the target is not reached

Figure 1. An example of a restructuring plan established for a loss ﬁrm at year 1, in order to reach the business
target within the 3-year window (i.e. succeed by year 4).
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Year 1

State: profit; Decision: no
restructuring; Max. Prob.
of success = 0.75

Reach the business target
by year 2: success

Unable to reach the business target by year 2
State: profit; Decision: no
restructuring; Max Prob.
of success = 0.66

State: loss; Decision:
downsizing; Max Prob. of
success = 0.37

Reach the business target
by year 3: success

Year 2

Reach the business target
by year 3: success

Unable to reach the business target by year 3
State: profit; Decision: no
restructuring; Max Prob.
of success = 0.51

State: loss; Decision: no
restructuring; Max Prob.
of success = 0.18

State: profit; Decision:
change management; Max
Prob. of success = 0.57

State: loss; Decision:
downsizing; Max Prob. of
success = 0.28

Year 3

Outcome of the plan:
whether
the
targetorisnot
reached
the target
by year
is 4
or
the target
is not
reached
by year
4? reached

Figure 2. An example of a restructuring plan established for a proﬁt ﬁrm at year 1, in order to reach the business
target within the 3-year window (i.e. succeed by year 4).

This plan also contains the optimal decisions for
each possible state that might occur in year 2 and
year 3, based upon the parameters estimated at
year 1. If, in years 2 and 3, these estimations are
still held and the ending point of the planning
window is not re-deﬁned, this restructuring plan
set up at year 1 will be good for all three years.
However, in reality the situation may be more
complicated and require modiﬁcation of the plan
when new information is received. For example,
suppose that the company is a ‘proﬁt’ ﬁrm at year
1. At year 2, the state of the company is ‘loss’, and
managers decide to extend the planning window to
the end of year 5 and update relevant parameter
estimations from year 1. In this case, we can apply
the proposed method and revise the plan at year 2
by setting year 2 as period 1 and letting N ¼ 4:
Then, a new plan will be established that might
suggest a diﬀerent decision at year 2 from
‘downsizing’, as was suggested in the plan of year
1 (see Figure 2).
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Compared to our proposed approach, it may
seem to be simpler for managers to evaluate the
probabilities anew at the beginning of each period
with respect to the likelihood of achieving their
objective(s) with or without restructuring, given
their knowledge of what has passed in the
preceding period(s), and then to choose a plan
they expect to yield the highest probability.
However, under this approach, the calculated
probability of achieving the objective is based on
past restructuring events and their outcome, due to
decisions which may or may not be optimal. In
contrast, our proposed approach uses the backward procedure to maximize the probability of
success, considering all possible state transitions
and scenarios for the future periods, and the
optimal sequences for restructuring decisions in
response to each of them. According to the
principle of optimality, the solution for the current
period is optimal, and thus can beat the above
simple approach.
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CONCLUSION
We have evaluated important managerial issues
relating to the causes and consequences of
corporate restructuring, utilizing a mathematical
model which incorporates analytical techniques.
The logic behind decision-making of timing and
restructuring activities is presented by using the
technique of dynamic programming. The objective
in the model, maximizing the likelihood of reaching business goal(s), is a reasonable one for
management. Nevertheless, corporate goal setting
depends on the ﬁrm’s business environment and
the interests of its diﬀerent stakeholders. Also, the
parameters and variables presented in the model
(e.g. state variables, decision variables, and measures of performance), as well as the division of
periods, should be deﬁned based on the practical
needs of the ﬁrm in order to properly facilitate
decision-making.
This paper is a ﬁrst attempt at developing a
model, which incorporates analytical skills within
the decision-making process that governs restructuring. Once the variables and parameters are well
deﬁned, the concept behind the model could be
generally applied to the development of related
strategies. Moreover, this analytical work can
enhance the use of decision support systems. In
the future, we hope to build on the insights and the
ﬁndings of signiﬁcant factors associated with ﬁrms’
market and operating performance so as to further
enhance the application of the analytical modeling
to the development of restructuring strategy.

NOTES
1. Manne (1965) ﬁnds that the threat of takeover could
mitigate the agency problem by forcing the management to refocus so as to improve eﬃciency. Several
other papers document the relationship between
takeover threats and restructurings. See, for example,
Bhagat et al. (1990), Bhide (1990), and Berger and
Ofek (1999) for evidence of restructuring following
successful takeover; Dann and DeAngelo (1988) for
evidence on defensive asset restructurings; and Denis
et al. (1997) and Berger and Ofek (1999) for evidence
on the inﬂuence of external control pressures on
corporate refocusing activity.
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